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TAKE ONE STEP FORWARD:  FEDERAL COURTS CONTINUE TO FIND THAT 
VOLUNTEERS ARE SHIELDED FROM RETALIATION BASED ON 
PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Brownsville, Texas, does not conjure up the image of a First Amendment bastion, but a 
recent decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas might 
change some people’s minds.  On January 14, 2010, Judge Hilda G. Tagle ruled that the First 
Amendment prohibits government actors from retaliating against volunteers on the basis of 
protected free speech.1  The decision came in a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in 
Hanson v. Cameron County,2 which involved a lawsuit brought by a former chaplain at the 
Cameron County Jail who alleged she was wrongfully discharged from her volunteer position in 
retaliation for exercising her right to free speech.3
 The decision in Brownsville is the latest marker in a continuing pattern of federal courts 
holding that a volunteer is shielded from retaliation based on protected speech under the First 
Amendment.
 
4  Although this issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court, lower courts that 
have analyzed whether a volunteer is protected from retaliation based on First Amendment 
speech have unanimously held or indicated that the answer is “yes.”5
 The prior decisions relating to a volunteer’s protection from retaliation based on 
protected speech under the First Amendment indicate the recent decision in the Southern District 
   
                                                 
1 See Hanson v. Cameron Cnty., No. B-09-202, 2010 WL 148723, at *6 (S.D.Tex. Jan. 14, 2010). 
2 Hanson, 2010 WL 148723, at *1, *6. 
3 The parties settled the case before trial. Compromise Settlement Agreement & General Release, Hanson, 2010 WL 
148723 (No. B-09-202).  Under the settlement agreement, Ms. Hanson, the volunteer chaplain, must give notice to 
the County and give it a reasonable time to correct the situation before she speaks out in a public forum or to the 
media about any jail conditions of concern to her.  Id. at 3–4.  The chaplain acknowledged in the agreement that this 
temporarily limits her state and federal free speech rights only during the reasonable time period provided by the 
County and Sheriff’s Department.  Id. at 4.  Ms. Hanson also agreed to immediately report to a law enforcement 
agency any conduct—regardless of its source—that she believes is a criminal offense.  Id. at 3.  The settlement 
agreement also stipulates that entry into the jails is a revocable privilege.  Id. at 2.  In exchange, the Defendants 
agreed not to revoke or restrict the privilege if Ms. Hanson makes her concerns public—so long as she complies 
with the stipulation that she notify the Defendants first and gives them time to resolve the complaints.  Id. at 4–5.    
  The settlement agreement also allows Ms. Hanson to resume her ministry at the jail, creates a policy for the 
jail to follow to deal fairly with chaplains, and requires a payment of $25,000 by the county to the attorneys working 
for Ms. Hanson.  Id. at 2–5.  Additionally, the agreement provides that the Defendants will instruct detention officers 
and jail administrative staff that Ms. Hanson is to be treated with the same courtesy and respect due all volunteer 
chaplains.  Id. at 5. 
4 See, e.g., Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 534–35 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a volunteer stated 
a claim for retaliation based on protected speech); Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 2000) (reasoning 
that a person or organization’s exercise of protected free speech rights cannot be the basis of preventing that person 
or organization from volunteering); Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that even 
though a volunteer had no right in the first instance to serve as a volunteer, and even though such a volunteer could 
be terminated at will, the government could not terminate such a volunteer in retaliation for that volunteer’s exercise 
of his First Amendment rights). 
5 See, e.g., id. 
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of Texas is not merely a trend, but is and will be, the rule in federal courts that address this 
issue.6
This article contains four parts.  Part I examines the decision in Hanson v. Cameron 
County.  Part II surveys federal authorities that have addressed the issue of whether a volunteer is 
protected from retaliation based on protected speech under the First Amendment.  Part III 
compares those authorities to Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases.  Part IV weighs the 
widely used arguments by both sides in these cases, and it includes discussion on the key issue of 
whether a volunteer position is a valuable government benefit. 
   
I.  HANSON V. CAMERON COUNTY 
 On September 1, 2009, Plaintiff Gail Hanson filed suit against Defendants Cameron 
County and Omar Lucio, who serves as Sheriff of Cameron County.7  Ms. Hanson alleged that 
Defendants “retaliated against her after she publicly criticized Defendants’ operation of the 
Cameron County Jail (“jail”).”8  Ms. Hanson alleged that, since 2000, she had “served as an 
official volunteer chaplain at the jail.”9
As part of the application process for Ms. Hanson to become a volunteer chaplain, she 
submitted to a background check performed by Cameron County, completed an application, and 
submitted “a letter of support from the pastor at her church.”
  
10  After these tasks were completed, 
“Cameron County issued her an official volunteer chaplain’s badge.”11 As a result, Ms. Hanson 
was allowed to “visit inmates without being placed on an individual prisoner’s approved visitors 
list.”12  She was also allowed ‘contact’ visits, while other visitors could only speak to inmates 
from behind a glass barrier.13  Ms. Hanson was also “permitted to speak with several prisoners at 
a time and without the prior authorization of Defendants’ staff.”14
“In early 2009, [Ms.] Hanson spoke at a public political candidate forum regarding the 
conditions that she observed at the jail, which she alleged included women suffering 
miscarriages as the result of poor health services.”
   
15  Ms. Hanson alleged that, shortly after the 
political forum, Defendant Lucio ordered that Ms. Hanson was banned from the jail.16 Plaintiff 
sought injunctive relief to prevent “Defendants from banning her from the jail and declaratory 
relief allowing her to continue her volunteer ministry.”17
Ms. Hanson’s lawsuit centered on her claims that the Defendants stripped her of her 
position as a jail minister and banned her from the jail after she publically criticized Defendants’ 
  
6 See, e.g., id. 
7 Hanson, 2010 WL 148723, at *1. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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operation of the jail.18  Defendants argued that, as a volunteer, Ms. Hanson had no right to be at 
the jail and no protectable interest in her service as a volunteer.19
 Was the sherriff legally entitled to ban Ms. Hanson, a volunteer, for her speech at a 
political rally?  The clear answer from Judge Tagle was “no.”
   
20
 At the motion to dismiss stage, the court found that Ms. Hanson’s service as a prison 
minister—even though it was done in a volunteer capacity—is the type of “governmental benefit 
or privilege the deprivation of which triggers First Amendment scrutiny.”
   
21  Therefore, the court 
concluded that Ms. Hanson “stated an actionable claim for speech retaliation for revoking her 
volunteer minister credentials in retaliation for her public speech.”22
 
 
 Ms. Hanson prevailed at the motion to dismiss stage because her complaint was grounded 
in First Amendment jurisprudence that prohibits government actors from retaliating against 
volunteers on the basis of speech.23  Indeed, Judge Tagle’s decision helps solidify a pattern in the 
federal courts recognizing that volunteers are protected from retaliation based on First 
Amendment speech.24
 In Ms. Hanson’s case, Defendants attempted to characterize her complaint as claiming a 
“right to minister at the [Cameron County] jail.”
 
25 But Ms. Hanson asserted no such “right,” and 
her claims were not based on this purported “right.”26  Ms. Hanson’s case was about the 
government’s duty not to punish protected speech, not her “right” to a governmental benefit.27
 
  
As one federal court maintained: 
For at least a quarter-century, th[e Supreme] Court has made clear that 
even though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit 
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number 
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not 
rely.  It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom of 
speech.28
                                                 
18 Id. at *4. 
 
19 See id. at *1, *4–5. 
20 Id. at *6 (holding that the plaintiff had presented an actionable claim). 
21 See id. at *2. 
22 Id. at *6. 
23 See generally, id. at *6 (“[T]he Court’s conclusion squares with the decisions of other courts who have considered 
speech retaliation issues in a volunteer and non-employment contexts.”) (citation omitted). 
24 Id. at *2 (citation omitted). See discussion infra Part II 
25 Hanson, 2010 WL 148723, at *1. 
26 See id. at *2. 
27 See also Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 357 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the district court found sufficient 
evidence that the defendant police officials deprived the plaintiffs, instructors at a police academy, of the benefit of 
continued enrollment in their courses and at least some of the defendants sought to have the instructors removed 
from the academy altogether after the plaintiffs testified as experts against the police in an excessive force case). See 
generally, Hanson, 2010 WL 148723 at *2 (“[Plaintiff] alleges a claim that Defendants retaliated against her by 
taking away her ability to be a volunteer at the jail, a governmental benefit or privilege the deprivation of which 
triggers First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
28 See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 357 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).   
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 In Perry v. Sindermann,29 for example, a non-tenured teacher alleged that the non-
renewal of his one-year contract based on protected speech triggered First Amendment 
scrutiny.30  The Supreme Court agreed.31  The Court reasoned that, even though a plaintiff has no 
right to a valuable government benefit, that benefit cannot be taken away based on protected 
speech by the Plaintiff.32  “Thus, the [non-tenured teacher’s] lack of a contractual or tenure 
‘right’ to re-employment” was “immaterial to his free speech claim.”33
 
 
II.  THE GREAT WEIGHT OF FEDERAL AUTHORITIES SUGGESTS THAT A 
VOLUNTEER IS PROTECTED FROM RETALIATION BASED  
ON PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
 As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether a 
volunteer is protected from retaliation based on protected free speech under the First 
Amendment.34  As discussed below, all federal appellate courts that have decided this issue, 
however, have held that a volunteer is afforded protection from retaliation under the First 
Amendment.35
 
 
  
Seventh Circuit 
 In Mosely v. Board of Education of Chicago,36 a mother claimed the school board 
violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating against her for advocating in favor of her 
child’s educational rights – the claim was rooted in the school board’s dismissal of her as the 
chairperson of a school committee.37  The district court dismissed Mosley’s retaliation claim, 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a claim.38
                                                 
29 408 U.S. 593. 
  The Seventh Circuit reversed, 
stating that: 
30 Id. at 595. 
31 See id. at 597–98. 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 See Barton v. Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 24, 26–27 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that “as of April 2006, the law was not 
sufficiently clear to put. . . [the defendant] on notice that declining to reappoint. . . [the plaintiff] to the volunteer 
position of Parks Commissioner in retaliation for his First Amendment activities was unlawful” because the issue of 
“whether a volunteer position is a valuable government benefit the loss of which can form the basis of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim had not been decided”). 
35 See infra Part II. 
36 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006). 
37 See id. at 529–30, 534. 
38 Id. at 529.   
 Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that “Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added).  
Thus, First Amendment retaliation claims (i.e., Constitutional claims) can be brought under section 1983.  See 
Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1148 (1998) (stating that the elements 
needed to be alleged for a First Amendment retaliation claim by volunteers, or individuals that are not technically 
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[i]n the analogous context of public employees who allege that their employers 
retaliated against them based on assertions of First Amendment rights, we have 
observed that a “§ 1983 case does not require an adverse employment action 
within the meaning of the antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.”39
 
   
The court found that Mosely effectively could not serve as chairperson of the school’s Improving 
America’s Schools Act (“IASA”) committee due to retaliation.40  In addition, the court cited a 
“direct allegation of action . . . designed to chill [Mosely’s] free speech.”41  Namely, a teacher 
called the police to have Mosely removed from school while passing out flyers regarding an 
IASA meeting.42
 
 
 The Seventh Circuit stated, “The fact that Mosely was a volunteer as opposed to a paid 
city employee is of little consequence to our analysis.”43  This position was based in the reality 
that Mosely did not bring a procedural due process claim, which would have required her to have 
a protected property interest in her position as IASA chairperson.44  The First Amendment claim 
required only a determination that the school “unconstitutionally retaliated against” her for 
engaging in protected speech.45  While Mosely did not have a “right” to the valuable government 
benefit of her volunteer position, her service as chairperson of the IASA committee precluded 
the government from denying that valuable benefit on a basis that violated constitutionally 
protected interests, especially freedom of speech.46
 
 
 
Eighth Circuit 
 In a case with facts very different from Mosely, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the right of 
volunteers not to be retaliated against for exercising their protected free speech rights.47  In 
Cuffley v. Mickes,48 the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission denied the 
application of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) to participate in the Adopt-A-Highway (AAH) 
program.49  The state denied the KKK’s application, in part, because Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 prevented the state from conferring a benefit on the KKK because of their 
discriminatory practices based on race, creed, color, and national origin.50
                                                                                                                                                             
employees, include the following:  “(1) the loss of a valuable government benefit (2) in retaliation for their speech 
(3) on a matter of public concern”).  
  The court held, “So 
long as the State does not deny anyone an opportunity to adopt a highway on an improper basis, 
39 Id. at 533 (quoting Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
40 Id. at 534. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (citing McGill v. Bd. of Educ. of Pekin Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 108, 602 F.2d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
46 Id. at 534–35 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
47 Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 2000). 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 704. 
50 Id. at 705. 
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the State does not violate Title VI.  The Klan, as one of many voluntary participants in the 
program, is free to determine its own membership.”51
 
 
 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the state denied the KKK’s application based on the 
organization’s beliefs and advocacy because it could provide no “convincing and constitutional 
reason for the denial.”52  As such, Cuffley provides two important insights in this line of cases.  
First, the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission assumed that allowing volunteers 
to participate conferred a government benefit, and the court did not challenge that 
categorization.53  Second, a person or organization’s exercise of protected free speech rights 
cannot be the basis of preventing that person or organization from volunteering.54  This is 
distinguishable from but analogous to Mosely, supra, and Hyland, infra, which prevent 
termination of someone in a volunteer position from exercising protected free speech rights.55
 
 
 
Ninth Circuit 
 Hyland v. Wonder56 involved a volunteer with the San Francisco Juvenile Probation 
Department who wrote a memorandum to the judges supervising Juvenile Hall regarding 
problems there and failings of the Department’s director.57  His allegations against the director, 
Stephen La Plante, included a charge of incompetent administration, citing low staff morale, a 
decline in accountability, and lack of leadership in the department.58  Immediately upon 
discovering that Hyland had written this memorandum, the chief probation officer of the 
Department told Hyland to leave and that he would never “be allowed into Juvenile Hall 
again.”59  Hyland also alleged that other retaliatory incidents designed to prevent him from 
working in juvenile justice occurred or were threatened.60
 
 
 Hyland filed suit, alleging that his termination came in violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it was retaliation for his protected speech.61  The district court 
dismissed Hyland’s federal action for failure to state a claim.62  The Ninth Circuit reversed and 
resoundingly affirmed that the opportunity to serve as a volunteer with the city Juvenile 
Probation Department was the type of governmental benefit or privilege that could not be denied 
on the basis of constitutionally protected speech.63
                                                 
51 Id. at 711. 
  The court held that even though a volunteer 
had no right in the first instance to serve as a volunteer, and even though such a volunteer could 
be terminated at will, the government could not terminate such a volunteer in retaliation for that 
52 Id. at 707. 
53 See id. In fact, the Eighth Circuit noted that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits had already recognized that volunteer 
positions constituted a valuable government benefit.  Id. at 707–08 n. 5 (citing Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723, 
727 (10th Cir. 1996); Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d  1129,1135 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
54 See id. at 709.  
55 See Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2006); Hyland 972 F.2d at 1136. 
56 972 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1992). 
57 Id. at 1133. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1133–34. 
63 Id. at 1135, 1143. 
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volunteer’s exercise of his First Amendment rights.64  Even if the loss of a volunteer position 
perhaps is not as momentous as a salaried employee being terminated, the Ninth Circuit argued 
that “[r]etaliatory actions . . . are equally egregious in the eyes of the Constitution because a 
person is being punished for engaging in protected speech.”65
 
 
 The Ninth Circuit was detailed in its explication of why volunteering is a government 
benefit: “a person gains valuable experience and education in public administration and can 
make professional contacts . . . . The opportunity to serve as a volunteer is also important 
because it provides an individual the satisfaction of making a contribution, or giving something 
back, to society.”66  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit supported the position that the Seventh 
Circuit would later assert— simply because Hyland had no right to be a volunteer and served in 
that position at-will does not diminish his First Amendment retaliation claim.67
 
 
 
Tenth Circuit 
 The Tenth Circuit, in Andersen v. McCotter,68 reaffirmed the notion that just because an 
individual serves as a volunteer does not mean his or her rights to First Amendment protection 
are diminished.69  In Andersen, a college student obtained an internship with the Utah Board of 
Pardons.70  She was assigned to work “assisting in a therapy program for sex-offenders.” 71 
When the Utah Department of Corrections (“DOC”) proposed changing its sex-offender 
treatment programs, Andersen gave a television interview criticizing the changes and warning 
they could result in sex offenders possibly being released too early.72  The next day, the DOC 
fired Andersen from her internship, stating she had violated policy by saying “something 
negative about the Department.”73
  
 
 Andersen filed suit under § 1983, basing her claim on the position that her speech was 
“on a matter of public concern and was, therefore, protected by the First Amendment.”74  The 
district court dismissed the case, stating that Andersen’s constitutional rights had not been 
violated.75  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit declared Andersen was a government employee, based 
upon the facts that she was paid for twenty hours of work per week and received college credit 
for additional hours she worked.76  The payment and credit both constituted valuable government 
benefits in the eyes of the court.77  As a result, despite being an at-will employee, Andersen’s 
First Amendment claim could not be diminished.78
                                                 
64 Id. at 1136. 
 
65 Id. at 1135. 
66 Id. at 1135–36. 
67 Id. at 1136. 
68 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996). 
69 Anderson, 100 F.3d at 727. 
70 Id. at 725. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 726. 
77 Id. at 726. 
78 Id. at 726–27. 
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 The Tenth Circuit analysis, however, went even further.  In applying the Pickering 
balancing test,79 the court noted that “even if we accepted Defendants’ arguments and considered 
Ms. Andersen a nonpaid volunteer, her claim would not be defeated.  Defendants argue that 
volunteers are not entitled to First Amendment protection under Pickering.  We disagree.”80  The 
Tenth Circuit noted that exercising free speech rights is not dependent upon earning a salary and 
that the Supreme Court has cited a variety of benefits outside the traditional scope of the 
employer-employee relationship that “cannot be denied solely because of the exercise of 
constitutional rights.”81  Once the Court determined Andersen had a protectable interest, it 
applied the Pickering balancing test and declared that the district court erred in dismissing the 
case.82
 
 
 Other federal appellate courts that have not actually decided the issue have affirmatively 
suggested that they would afford a volunteer protection from retaliation under the First 
Amendment, as detailed below.83
 
  
 
First Circuit 
 In Lynch v. City of Boston,84 Heather Lynch sued the City and various city employees 
after she was both prohibited from working as a seasonal employee during Boston’s “Can Share” 
food drive and removed from her volunteer position on the Mayor’s Hunger Commission; 
positions she had held from 1986 and 1987 until 1993 and 1994.85  In December 1993, Lynch 
received a flyer that had been distributed to all Boston employees by Thomas Menino, Boston’s 
newly elected mayor, which “encouraged employees to provide suggestions to his office for the 
improvement of City services.”86  In response to the flyer, on January 12, 1994, Lynch made 
what she intended to be an anonymous call to the Mayor’s office, complaining about the lack of 
staffing at the Boston’s Emergency Shelter Commission (ESC), which conducted the Can Share 
effort.87  Coincidentally, Lynch spoke to John Greely at the Mayor’s office, who was the 
husband of Kelley Cronin, Lynch’s supervisor at the Can Share program and the Executive 
Director of the ESC.88  Upon hearing about the call, Cronin told Lynch to “clear out your 
desk.”89
                                                 
79 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).   The Pickering balancing test, 
discussed infra Parts II and III, involves a balancing between the interests of the employee, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.   
  Cronin later told Lynch she would not be working on the 1994 Can Share drive, and 
informed her that she had been removed from her volunteer position on the Mayor’s Hunger 
80 Andersen, 100 F.3d at 727. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 728–29. 
83 See, e.g., Lynch v. City of Boston, 180 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire 
Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1979); Versarge v. Township of Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1364 (3d Cir. 1993). 
84 180 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999). 
85 Lynch, 180 F.3d at 7. 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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Commission.90  Lynch claimed that Cronin’s actions against her violated the First Amendment, 
§ 1983, and Massachusetts law.91  After the jury rendered a verdict, the District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts entered a judgment holding that Cronin was qualifiedly immune from 
the First Amendment claim, that the city was not liable, and that Lynch was entitled to $4,000 in 
damages for emotional distress.92
 Although the court held that Cronin was entitled to qualified immunity because her 
actions against Lynch did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known,”
 
93 the court suggested that it otherwise would 
have afforded Lynch protection from retaliation under the First Amendment.94  The court stated, 
using the Hyland language without citing the case itself, “We assume, without deciding, that the 
opportunity to serve as a volunteer could constitute the type of valuable governmental benefit or 
privilege the deprivation of which can trigger First Amendment scrutiny.”95   
 
Second Circuit 
 Robert Janusaitis, a volunteer fireman, submitted a report criticizing the management of 
the Fire Department.96  In the report, he stated that training and morale at the Department were 
inadequate and that Department accounting practices were unacceptable.97  After receiving no 
response, he drafted a letter to the IRS stating that the Department was “violating the Internal 
Revenue Code and generally accepted accounting principles.”98  He sent a draft to the 
Department’s Executive Committee, threatening to also send it to the IRS if the Department did 
not change their accounting practices.99  The Executive Committee and Department chief 
suspended Janusaitis for thirty days.100  After returning to active duty, Janusaitis wrote another 
letter to the Executive Committee stating that the suspension was politically motivated and 
demanding an apology.101  Janusaitis later delivered a letter to the First Selectman of the Town, 
threatening to publicize an attached document that discussed how the Fire Department was trying 
to “cover up” the situation and explaining that he was planning to sue.102  Finally, seven months 
after Janusaitis wrote his initial report, he participated in conversations with a reporter, who 
published a story titled “Fireman Tells Story After Reinstatement.”103  After the article was 
published, the Department chief and officers fired Janusaitis, and his dismissal was upheld by the 
Executive Committee.104
                                                 
90 Id. at 7. 
  Janusaitis sued under §§1983, 1985 and 1988 and for violations of his 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 7–9. 
93 Id. at 13 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
94 See id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
95 Id.; accord Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1992). 
96 Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 18 (1979). 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 19. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. 
104 Id. at 20. 
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First Amendment Rights.105  The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that the 
Department’s expulsion did not constitute state action, and that even assuming state action, the 
dismissal did not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.106
 Contrary to the district court, which held that Janusaitis’s interview with the reporter was 
the only exercise of free speech,
 
107 the Second Circuit found that Janusaitis’s letter to the IRS, 
the threatened lawsuit, the communication to the First Selectman, and the newspaper interview 
all came within the protection of the First Amendment.108  The court never addressed Janusaitis’s 
status as a “volunteer fireman,” simply assuming that it was appropriate to apply the Pickering 
balancing test because the case involved “the various exercises of speech by appellant.”109  The 
court ultimately held that the successful functioning of the Fire Department outweighed 
Janusaitis’s interests, especially because Janusaitis’s actions were “more concerned with proving 
himself right and every one else wrong than with truly promoting the welfare and efficiency of 
the Department.”110
 
 
 
 
Third Circuit 
 Paul Versarge was dismissed after working for a decade as a volunteer firefighter.111  In 
his capacity as a private citizen, he requested that the Township of Clinton close a neighborhood 
street to traffic.112  Versarge’s boss, the fire chief, publicly opposed the closure because it would 
make it more difficult for emergency vehicles to respond to emergencies in the neighborhood.113  
Disagreement between Versarge and the fire chief escalated, culminating in Versarge writing a 
letter to the Mayor of Clinton stating that construction work had been done “at the firehouse 
without first obtaining the proper building or electrical permits.”114  Versarge wrote an additional 
letter to the Mayor in response to the fire chief’s letter.115  Versarge was then fired.116  After 
unsuccessfully trying to appeal his expulsion, Versarge filed suit, alleging violations of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments and seeking relief under § 1983.117  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, and Versarge appealed.118
 At the outset of its First Amendment analysis of the retaliatory expulsion claim,
 
119
                                                 
105 Id. at 18. 
 the 
Third Circuit quoted Perry, stating that the government “‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
106 Id. at 21. 
107 Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 464 F.Supp. 288, 296 (D. Conn. 1979). 
108 Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 25. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. at 26–27 (quoting Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 464 F.Supp. 288, 296 (D. Conn. 1979)). 
111 See Versarge v. Twp. of Clinton N.J.,, 984 F.2d 1359, 1361 (3d Cir. 1993). 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 1362. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1362–63. 
118 Id. at 1361. 
119 Id. at 1364.  
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basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom 
of speech.’”120
At this juncture, we need not, and do not, conclude that plaintiff was an 
“employee” of the Hose Company or the Township.  Rather, we assume, without 
deciding, that “the opportunity to serve as a volunteer constitutes the type of 
governmental benefit or privilege the deprivation of which can trigger First 
Amendment scrutiny.”
  It went on to state: 
121
Despite this position, the court applied the Pickering balancing test and cited to Janusaitis,
 
122 
ultimately holding that the First Amendment did not protect the Plaintiff’s speech because “the 
interests of the Hose Company outweigh the limited interests of plaintiff and the public in 
plaintiff’s speech.”123
 Therefore, based upon the aforementioned survey of applicable case law, it appears that 
no federal appellate court has held that a volunteer, as a matter of law, should not be afforded 
protection from retaliation under the First Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.  THE DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS ARE CONSISTENT  
WITH ANALOGOUS SUPREME COURT CASES 
 
 As noted by the Seventh Circuit, the fact that a plaintiff is a volunteer as opposed to a 
paid city employee is of little consequence to the First Amendment retaliation analysis.124   
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the narrow issue of volunteers, in an analogous 
case, the Supreme Court held that the government may not retaliate “against a contractor, or a 
regular provider of services, for the exercise of rights” under the First Amendment.125
 
 
 In O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, a company had been providing towing 
services to the city of Northlake.126
                                                 
120 Id. (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
  Such providers of services had been removed from the list of 
121 Id. (quoting Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
122 Versarge, 984 F.2d at 1367. 
123 Id. at 1368. 
124 See Mosely v. Bd. of Educ., 434 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 2006). 
125 See O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 715, 720 (1996) (emphasis added); see also Bd. 
of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 672-673 (1996) (holding that the First Amendment protects 
independent contractors from termination or prevention of automatic renewal of at-will government contracts in 
retaliation for their exercise of freedom of speech); Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (holding that 
even though low-level public employees had no legal entitlement to the promotions, transfers, and recalls, the 
government may not rely on a basis that infringes their First Amendment interests to deny them these valuable 
benefits); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (holding that the First Amendment forbids government officials 
to discharge or threaten to discharge public employees solely for not being supporters of the political party in power, 
unless party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position involved); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 
(1976) (holding that the practice of patronage dismissals is unconstitutional under the First Amendment).  
126 O’Hare Truck Serv., 518 U.S. at 715. 
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providers only for cause.127  The owner of O’Hare Truck Services refused to contribute to the 
Northlake mayor’s reelection campaign and, instead, supported his opponent.128  Northlake then 
removed O’Hare from its list of service providers.129  The company alleged that its removal was 
in retaliation for not supporting the mayor’s reelection and resulted in substantial lost income.130  
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Seventh Circuit precedent that prevented 
government officials from discharging employees for refusing to support a political party or its 
candidates did not apply to independent contractors.131  The Seventh Circuit affirmed.132
 
 
 The Supreme Court rejected the notion that First Amendment protections for those 
outside the traditional employment context are trumped by the government’s desire to advance a 
patronage system.133  Drawing such a distinction between employees and independent 
contractors, the Court said, would make constitutional rights unacceptably dependent on the 
government’s classification of someone as an employee or independent contractor.134  Despite a 
long history in American law of treating employees and independent contractors differently, the 
Court said it was inappropriate for a constitutional claim to rise or fall based on a distinction that 
is “a creature of the common law of agency and torts.”135  In addition, such a rule would invite 
abuse, allowing the government to “avoid constitutional liability simply by attaching different 
labels to particular jobs.”136
 
  Thus, the Court in O’Hare unequivocally recognized that retaliation 
claims now extend beyond traditional employer-employee relationships.  Furthermore, nothing in 
O’Hare implies that a regular provider of services must be paid; it should be sufficient that the 
provider receives a valuable government benefit as a result of rendering services.  Under the 
reasoning of O’Hare, volunteers should be protected from retaliation based on the exercise of 
First Amendment rights.      
IV.  THUS FAR, COURTS HAVE DISAGREED WITH OPPONENTS OF A VOLUNTEER 
RETALIATION CLAIM WHO ARGUE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT  
BEING A VOLUNTEER IS NOT A PROTECTABLE INTEREST  
OR VALUABLE BENEFIT 
  
 Many courts have addressed — and dismissed — the arguments used by opponents of 
volunteer retaliation claims.  For example, in denying the KKK’s Adopt-A-Highway application 
in Cuffley, the government asserted various state and federal statutes and regulations as the basis 
for justifying its actions.137  The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected those assertions as after-the-
fact, pretextual justifications.138
 
   
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See id. 
130 Id. at 716. 
131 See id. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 720. 
134 Id. at 721 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 721 (1996)). 
135 See id. at 722  
136 Id. (citing Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 679). 
137 See Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 708–11 (8th Cir. 2000). 
138See id. at 711. 
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 In Hyland, the state argued that because the information disclosed by Hyland was stale, 
conveyed only in an internal communication, and merely involved a personnel dispute there was 
no First Amendment infringement.139  The Ninth Circuit disagreed.140  First, limited circulation 
does not lessen the public concern analysis in a Pickering analysis.141  Second, “general public 
awareness of an issue does not make all further investigation or in-depth discussion of the matter 
redundant, superfluous, or devoid of public interest.”142  Third, casting the issue as a personnel 
dispute did not free the court to simply ignore the public interest analysis.143
 
   
 In Andersen, the state argued for a bright-line rule that an unpaid volunteer was unworthy 
of protection from retaliation.144  The Tenth Circuit rejected that notion out of hand.145
 
 
 The central issue facing the Third Circuit in Versarge was whether the plaintiff’s conduct 
was a disruption so significant that it impaired the function and harmony of the entity, which, in 
that case, was a fire department.146  The “mere existence of some disruption would not end our 
inquiry,” the Third Circuit said.147  “Disruption is simply a weight on the scales which must be 
balanced against the interests of plaintiff and the public in plaintiff’s speech.”148  The context of 
the disruption is important, and in Versarge the court found that the plaintiff’s statements 
impaired harmony in the volunteer fire department to such a degree that it detrimentally affected 
the close relationships required by the working environment.149
 
 
 In Lynch, the First Circuit recognized that volunteers might be constitutionally protected 
from retaliation, but the government asserted a qualified immunity defense.150  The court agreed 
that Lynch’s supervisor was protected by qualified immunity in this instance, but also noted that 
this defense is not absolute.151  The court also found that the free speech rights of volunteers 
were not “clearly established” at the time of the supervisor’s conduct.152
 
  Of course, a colorable 
argument now exists that volunteers in the First Circuit should be protected from retaliation 
because the Court has now “clearly established” this right. 
 In Janusaitis, the state asserted that the plaintiff’s speech impaired the performance of a 
government function.153  While the Second Circuit agreed that Janusaitis’s conduct had done so 
in this case, it noted that such an analysis must be conducted on a “case-by-case” basis.154
                                                 
139 See Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992). 
  The 
court ruled that the speech had undermined the government’s authority and, more importantly, 
140 See id. at 1138–39. 
141 See id. (quoting Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979)). 
142 Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1138 (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979)). 
143 See id.  
144 See Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 1996).  
145 Id. 
146 See Versage v. Twp. of Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (citing O’Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d 1059, 1062 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
149 See id. at 1367. 
150 See Lynch v. City of Boston, 180 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1999). 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
153 See Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1979). 
154 See id. 
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that the speech was primarily driven by Janusaitis’s personal motivation and not the public 
good.155
 
 
 The most common argument against a volunteer retaliation claim based on protected 
speech, however, is simply that the volunteer’s status “does not qualify as a ‘valuable 
government benefit,’ the loss of which would trigger a speech retaliation claim analysis.”156  No 
Supreme Court precedent directly limits “valuable government benefits” to paid work or vendor 
contracts.157  The Supreme Court, however, has stated that “[a]lthough the benefits withdrawn 
may be within the discretion of the government to award, the Government may not deny a 
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, 
his interest in freedom of speech.”158  The Supreme Court has also recognized that protections 
have been extended beyond the government employee retaliation context to the termination of at-
will employment contracts as well as the non-renewal of government vendor contracts.159  Thus, 
courts addressing the issue of whether the loss of volunteer status is a valuable government 
benefit, the loss of which would trigger a speech retaliation claim, have found that it is such a 
benefit.160
                                                 
155 See id. at 26. 
   
156 See Hanson v. Cameron Cnty, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 148723 *1, *4–6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2010). 
157 Id. at *5. 
158 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
159 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 670–71; Hanson, 2010 WL 148723 at *6.  
160 See, e.g., Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d at 1135–36; Hanson, 2010 WL 148723 at *6. 
 But cf. Barton v. Edward Clancy, Jr., 632 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2011) (involving a Parks Commissioner who 
claimed retaliation based on his First Amendment activity).  In Barton, the First Circuit argued that “the Second, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have found that volunteer positions are entitled to constitutional protection . . . [but 
those] cases relied in part, either directly or indirectly, on state statutes which mandate that such volunteers be 
treated as employees.”  Id. at 25.  Specifically, the Court in Barton claimed that the Ninth Circuit in Hyland, 972 
F.2d 1129, relied on the Second Circuit case, Janusaitis, 607 F.2d 17, the latter of which involved a Connecticut law 
that “specifically provided that volunteer firemen ‘shall be construed to be employees of the municipality’ for 
purposes of workmen’s compensation.”  Id. at 24 (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-314a) (citing Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 
21).  As an initial matter, the Court in Hyland did not rely on any California statute, or mention any state statute, in 
its analysis to determine that a juvenile probation department volunteer is protected from retaliation based on 
protected speech.  See Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1134–36.  In fact, the Ninth Circuit stated that “whether Hyland is 
labelled [sic] a public employee or a volunteer is not determinative of whether Hyland stated a claim of First 
Amendment” retaliation – the critical question was “whether Hyland alleged the loss of a valuable government 
benefit or privilege in retaliation for his speech”, which he had, based on the loss of his volunteer position.  Id. at 
1136, 1140–41 (referencing a California statute only with regard to the due process claim of Hyland, not his First 
Amendment retaliation claim, to conclude that Hyland had no property interest in the volunteer position and 
therefore could not maintain a due process claim, while he could maintain a First Amendment retaliation claim).  
Thus, the Barton Court’s argument that the Ninth Circuit in Hyland, 972 F.2d 1129, “found that volunteer positions 
are entitled to constitutional protection …[by relying] on state statutes which mandate such volunteers be treated as 
employees” is belied by the Hyland decision itself, 972 F.2d 1129,  as the Ninth Circuit (1) did not rely on any 
California statute, or mention any state statute, in its analysis to determine whether the volunteer was protected from 
retaliation based on protected speech, (2) stated that it was irrelevant whether an individual was a public employee 
or volunteer for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim, and (3) held that the loss of a volunteer position 
constituted the loss of a valuable government benefit or privilege that is afforded protection in a First Amendment 
retaliation claim.  See Barton, 632 F.3d at 25; Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1134-1136, 1140-1141.   
 Similarly, the Barton Court claimed that the Seventh Circuit in Mosely, 434 F.3d 527, relied upon another 
Seventh Circuit case, Brown v. Disciplinary Comm. of Edgerton Volunteer Fire Dep’t, the latter of which concluded 
that a volunteer firefighter could be protected by the First Amendment based in part on a Wisconsin state statute that 
treated volunteer firefighters as employees under the law for workmen’s compensation.  See Barton, 632 F.3d at 25; 
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In short, while the Pickering analysis binds a court’s ultimate decision, it is increasingly 
clear that volunteer status is a valuable governmental benefit, no less than potential business 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brown v. Disciplinary Comm. of Edgerton Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 97 F.3d 969, 973–74 (7th Cir. 1996).  Mosely, 
however, did not rely on any Illinois statute, or mention any state statute, in its analysis to determine that a mother 
serving as a chairperson on a school committee, which the Court described as a nominal position at best, is protected 
from retaliation based on protected speech.  See Mosely, 434 F.3d at 530, 533–35.  In fact, in accordance with the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Hyland, 972 F.2d 1129, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he fact that Mosely was a 
volunteer as opposed to a paid city employee is of little consequence to our analysis”—under a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, the issue is whether the defendants unconstitutionally retaliated against Mosely based on her 
protected speech.  Id. at 534 (distinguishing a procedural due process claim, which requires a protected property 
interest, from a First Amendment retaliation claim, which does not require a protected property interest).    
 As for the Second Circuit case, Janusaitis, 607 F.2d 17, the Barton Court argued that it too relied on “state 
statute[s] that treated volunteer[s] . . . as employees under the law.”  Barton, 632 F.3d at 25.  Specifically, the 
Barton Court claimed that the Janusaitis Court, “after concluding that the termination of the firefighter was ‘state 
action’ for purposes of a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim, . . . simply treated the firefighter as a public employee for 
purposes of the First Amendment claim.” Id, at 24 (citing Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 25) (emphasis added). In fact, the 
Janusaitis Court did not state that it relied on the Connecticut statute treating firefighters as employees under the 
workmen’s compensation statute to show that the plaintiff was entitled to protection as a volunteer, but instead used 
it to show that the actions of the defendant, Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, constituted state action as 
required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 21–22, 25.  As set forth above in this article, the court 
never addressed Janusaitis’s status as a “volunteer fireman” and simply assumed that it was appropriate to apply the 
Pickering balancing test because the case involved “the various exercises of speech by appellant.”  Id. at 25. 
 The Barton Court also attempted to rely on Hoyt v. Andreucci to argue that “Janusaitis does not appear to 
reflect the prevailing view of the Second Circuit.”  Barton, 632 F.3d at 24, n. 13; see Hoyt v. Andreucci, 433 F.3d 
320 (2d Cir. 2006).  In Hoyt, the Second Circuit stated that it “had not yet addressed whether ‘claims of termination 
from volunteer positions based on protected conduct are equivalent to, or should be analyzed different from, more 
traditional claims of termination from salaried government positions.’” Hoyt, 433 F.3d at 327 n.5 (quoting Gorman-
Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 552 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001)).  This argument also 
appears misplaced.  Hoyt involved an employee who was granted a leave of absence from his corrections officer job 
to fulfill his union leadership responsibilities.  Hoyt, 433 F.3d at 322.  Plaintiff Hoyt tried to analogize his situation 
during his leave to that of a volunteer, but his leave agreement made clear that “Hoyt would remain a public 
employee throughout his leave period.”  Id. at 327 n.5, 328.  As a result, the Court did not perform an analysis of 
plaintiff’s status as a volunteer because the Court found he was not a volunteer.  Id.  
 The Gorman case, quoted by Hoyt for the proposition relied on by Barton, involved plaintiffs who filed suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other things, violation of their First Amendment free speech rights.  
Gorman, 252 F.3d at 551.  In Gorman, plaintiffs alleged that the Cooperative, a subordinate government agency that 
ran programs such as the 4-H program, “retaliated against them by, among other things, terminating their volunteer 
status and enrollment in 4-H because . . . plaintiffs advocated policies contrary to those of defendants.”  Id.  In a 
footnote, the Court stated that the trial court “presumed that plaintiffs had suffered an adverse employment action.”  
Id. at 552 n.2.  The Court continued, “We do not address the question of whether plaintiffs’ claims of termination 
from volunteer positions based on protected conduct are equivalent to, or should be analyzed differently from, more 
traditional claims of termination from salaried government positions.”  Id. (citing Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 
1135 (9th Cir. 1992)) (holding that serving as a volunteer constituted a government benefit or privilege and that 
“retaliatory actions with less momentous consequences [than loss of employment], such as loss of a volunteer 
position, are equally egregious in the eyes of the Constitution because a person is being punished for engaging in 
protected speech”).  The Gorman Court remanded the case to the trial court for determinations relating to the 
Pickering balancing test and vacated the trial court’s granting of defendants’ summary judgment motion.  Id. at 557–
58.  The Court made no reference to a statute allowing the 4-H volunteers to be treated as employees, and the Court 
allowed the volunteers’ First Amendment Retaliation claim to proceed.  Id. Thus, it appears that the Second Circuit 
allows volunteers to pursue First Amendment retaliation claims.  Id.  
 Importantly, the Barton Court maintained, “no court has held that volunteers are not protected by the First 
Amendment.”  Barton, 632 F.3d at 25–26. 
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contracts or tax exemptions.161  Official volunteer positions are often difficult to obtain, and 
volunteer positions can often open the door for many other opportunities for the individual 
volunteer.162  The opportunity to serve as a volunteer is also an important governmental benefit 
“because it provides an individual the satisfaction of making a contribution to society.”163  In 
addition, volunteers should be protected from retaliation because they often provide the public 
with a unique and independent view of government.164
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Federal courts that have encountered the issue of whether a volunteer is shielded from 
retaliation based on protected speech under the First Amendment have consistently determined 
that the reach of a First Amendment retaliation claim extends to volunteers.  In Gail Hanson’s 
case, the federal court in Brownsville came to the same conclusion.  The key inquiry is whether 
volunteer status is the type of governmental benefit or privilege the deprivation of which triggers 
First Amendment scrutiny. Despite arguments to the contrary, federal courts have answered the 
latter question in the affirmative.  It is anticipated that other federal courts that decide the issue, 
including the United States Supreme Court, will likely and should continue the pattern and 
decide that volunteers are protected from retaliation based on the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights.   
 
 
                                                 
161 See Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1135–36. 
162 Id.   
163 Id.   
164 Potential volunteer plaintiffs should be aware that government defendants may often have an interest in 
regulating the speech of its employees. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968).   In Pickering, the Supreme Court held that government employees may not be compelled to relinquish the 
First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in 
connection with the operation of the public institutions in which they work. Id. The Court also recognized, however, 
that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from 
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. Id. Thus, the Court held 
that it is necessary to arrive at a balance between the interests of the employee, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees. While the courts will not apply the Pickering balancing test at the motion to dismiss 
stage of the proceedings because the application of that test requires a weighing of facts, a potential volunteer 
plaintiff should be prepared to battle governmental defendants on these grounds.  See Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-287 (1977) (suggesting whether government would have terminated plaintiff in the 
absence of protected conduct is a question of fact for the jury to decide); see also Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 
810 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The inquiry into whether Plaintiff’s interests in speaking outweigh the [Defendants’] interests 
in regulating Plaintiff’s speech is a factual determination conducted under the well known Pickering balancing 
test.”) (citation omitted). 
